How Indian Elections Are Won and What Voters Expect
CA. S. Muralidharan
Business Mentor and Thought Leader
Indian political experience over the past twenty years
India’s elections bring together several different struggles. Citizens vote for better livelihoods, recognition, security, honest government and leaders they trust. Parties seek to combine these expectations into a winning coalition. Caste, religion, money, development, unemployment, media and campaigning all enter that process. Family succession and post-election bargaining influence who leads those parties and how votes become governing power. Their importance changes from one state to another and from one election to the next.
This essay draws on Indian political experience over the past twenty years, particularly elections between 2007 and 2024, together with relevant research published subsequently. Its central argument is that voters rarely choose on a single consideration. Identity may influence whom they trust; performance may influence whether that trust survives. Money and family connections can determine which candidates become competitive. Campaigns and media shape how people interpret the choices. Alliances can then change the government those choices produce.
Election results establish who won. Explaining why requires surveys, research and attention to local conditions. An example can illustrate a mechanism without proving that the mechanism alone caused the outcome.
The study must also ask what elections have changed in society. One of Indian democracy’s important achievements is the expansion of political voice for Dalits, who faced entrenched exclusion. Evidence of greater representation, educational progress and improved living standards deserves a central place alongside criticism of money, dynasties and political bargaining. The record is significant but incomplete: increased political presence has not ensured equal dignity, security or economic opportunity.
The social foundations of democratic choice
India and the United States both give citizens opportunities to replace their rulers, but their political coalitions take different forms. America channels much of its social diversity into two dominant parties. In India, regional and community-based parties can retain separate organisations, govern states and negotiate with national parties. Much American coalition bargaining happens within parties; Indian bargaining happens both within and between parties.
India’s democracy also gave historically excluded citizens political equality in a society marked by deep social and economic inequalities. For many families, the vote became a means of demanding dignity and access to public institutions. A demand for community representation can therefore carry a practical message: our difficulties must receive a hearing.
This does not make Indian voters indifferent to policy. It means that policy, identity and trust often develop together. A voter may want employment, support social justice and favour a regional party without seeing any contradiction.
The institutional difference matters too. India’s executive depends on parliamentary support; the United States separately elects the presidency and Congress, with the Electoral College determining the presidential result. American primaries provide a route to competing for nominations that differs from the leadership-centred selection common in India. Neither arrangement removes money, identity or concentrated influence. American political coalitions also reflect race, religion, education and geography. It would be misleading to contrast an ideological American voter with an identity-driven Indian voter.
Caste can create a voice and broaden a coalition
Mayawati’s BSP victory in Uttar Pradesh in 2007 offers a useful example. The party won 206 seats in a 403-member Assembly. Its campaign expanded beyond its established Dalit base, reaching Brahmins and other groups through candidate selection and political outreach. The result illustrates how a party rooted in one community can seek a wider governing coalition. It does not mean that all Dalits or Brahmins voted alike.
The lesson is that caste politics involves negotiation as well as separation. Community representation can become the foundation of a broader agreement. It can also be used narrowly, with local intermediaries claiming influence over voters whose preferences are actually diverse.
Research supplies evidence of material benefits from representation. A 2022 study in the Journal of Development Economics estimated that a ten percentage-point increase in legislators from parties representing disadvantaged castes increased those households’ consumption through the food safety net by about four per cent. This is a specific result about access to subsidised food, not an estimate of overall prosperity.
Political visibility, however, does not guarantee administrative equality. A study of a rural electrification programme in Uttar Pradesh found that villages inhabited solely by Dalits were twenty percentage points less likely to receive coverage than villages without Dalits. Electoral success by the BSP did not remove that disparity in the setting studied.
Together, these findings suggest a balanced judgment. Community mobilisation can improve access and bargaining power. Lasting transformation also requires schools, employment, fair administration and effective institutions. A community gaining powerful leaders is only one measure of progress.
Dalit empowerment is a major outcome of electoral democracy
The experience of Dalits provides a demanding test of what electoral politics achieves. For communities historically denied equal standing, the ability to elect representatives, hold public office and influence governments changes their relationship with the state. Political participation creates a basis for demanding a hearing, rather than depending entirely on the goodwill of socially dominant groups.
Official statistics generally use the category Scheduled Castes, abbreviated here as SCs. Dalit is a wider social and political identification and is not perfectly interchangeable with that administrative category. The figures below therefore refer to SCs. They also come from different reference years; historical Census figures and poverty estimates should not be mistaken for conditions in 2026.
Political voice and authority
The Lok Sabha has 84 constituencies reserved for SC candidates. All eligible voters in those constituencies vote; they are not separate electorates. Reserved representation, party competition and independent mobilisation together make it harder to exclude SC citizens from the institutions where decisions are taken. A reserved seat guarantees eligibility for representation, however, rather than the representative’s independence from party leadership or effectiveness in office.
Mayawati’s leadership in Uttar Pradesh gives this change a visible political form. The significance of her party’s 2007 majority extends beyond the arithmetic of its social coalition. A Dalit woman could lead the government of a major state. For citizens whose communities had been treated as subordinate, this challenged assumptions about who could legitimately exercise authority. Symbolic recognition matters when humiliation and exclusion have been part of everyday life.
Francesca Jensenius’s research on electoral quotas finds that they helped integrate SC politicians into mainstream politics and reduce caste discrimination, particularly at the elite level. That is a substantive institutional change. It does not establish that caste prejudice disappeared among citizens or that poorer households gained the same status as elected leaders.
Representation can change public spending
The research evidence goes beyond symbolism. Rohini Pande’s study found that mandated political representation increased transfers benefiting the disadvantaged groups represented. Research summarised by J-PAL found that SC village heads provided, on average, about ten per cent more infrastructure projects in lower-caste areas than comparable areas without a reserved village head in the setting studied. The food safety-net evidence discussed earlier points in the same direction: representation can affect access to material benefits.
These findings identify particular effects in particular institutions. They should not be expanded into the claim that every SC representative delivers equally, or that every gain is confined to governments led by Dalit parties. Political influence can operate through representatives in mainstream parties, organised demands, competitive elections and scrutiny of administration. The rural electrification findings already discussed also show that winning office does not automatically remove unequal implementation.
Educational progress is substantial
Government compilations of Census data record SC literacy rising from 10.3 per cent in 1961 to 66.1 per cent in 2011. Female SC literacy rose from 3.3 per cent to 56.5 per cent across those years. Historical literacy definitions and age coverage have evolved, so these figures indicate the broad transformation rather than a perfectly uniform measurement over fifty years. A gap remained in 2011: literacy for the total population was 73 per cent.
More recent higher-education data also show progress. AISHE records the SC gross enrolment ratio rising from 18.9 per cent in 2014–15 to 25.9 per cent in 2021–22, against an overall ratio of 28.4 per cent in the latter year. This indicator relates enrolment to the population aged 18–23; it is not a graduation rate or a measure of learning quality. It demonstrates wider participation without establishing equal access to the best institutions or subsequent employment.
Public education, scholarships, reservations, household effort and social mobilisation have all contributed to educational opportunity. Political representation can support these policies and their implementation. The national trend alone cannot identify how much each factor contributed.
Living standards have improved while gaps remain
Historical government estimates put rural SC poverty at 53.5 per cent in 2004–05 and 31.5 per cent in 2011–12. Urban SC poverty declined from 40.6 per cent to 21.7 per cent. These are historical consumption-poverty estimates under that series’ methodology. They are not current rates and should not be directly combined with newer international poverty thresholds.
The 2023–24 Household Consumption Expenditure Survey offers a more recent view of relative living standards. Average monthly consumption per person among SCs was 3,878 rupees in rural areas, compared with 4,122 rupees across all groups. In urban areas, the corresponding amounts were 5,775 and 6,996 rupees. The survey’s Others category, excluding SCs, STs and OBCs, recorded 4,642 rupees in rural areas and 7,832 rupees in urban areas. These figures exclude imputed values of items received free through welfare programmes. They measure consumption, not income or ownership of assets.
The distinction matters. Families can consume more and educate their children better while still having less savings, property or financial resilience than others. Economic growth, migration, welfare and employment opportunities interact with political inclusion. We should recognise progress without attributing the entire change to electoral representation.
Social dignity and protection remain unfinished tasks
Public office and education do not ensure fair treatment in every workplace, neighbourhood or village. Political recognition can coexist with dependence on local employers, unequal access to institutions and discrimination. The experience differs across states, sub-castes, gender and household circumstances; Dalits are not a uniform political or economic group.
A parliamentary reply reporting NCRB data recorded 55,685 cases under the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act relating to crimes against SCs in 2024. Registered cases are not a complete count of actual incidence. Reporting, police registration and access to justice affect the figures, so their rise or fall alone cannot establish the direction of discrimination. Their continuing scale nevertheless underlines the importance of effective protection and enforcement.
The strongest conclusion is that electoral democracy has expanded Dalit political voice and produced some demonstrable improvements in resource allocation. Educational and economic progress is also clear, but has several causes. The incomplete step is converting representation into dependable rights and wider economic independence. A community gaining ministers is an achievement; an ordinary citizen obtaining fair treatment without needing a minister’s intervention is a further measure of democratic success.
Money shapes the choices before polling day
The influence of money begins well before voters reach the booth. Parties need candidates who can sustain an organisation, travel extensively, communicate with constituents and finance publicity. Personal wealth and access to donors can therefore strengthen an aspirant’s claim to a party ticket.
ADR’s affidavit-based database records that 504 of the 543 winners in the 2024 Lok Sabha election, or 93 per cent, declared assets exceeding one crore rupees. Assets are not campaign expenditure. They can include family property and do not establish wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the figures raise a serious question about how easily an ordinary person can enter competitive electoral politics.
Research on Indian political finance finds that competitive parties disproportionately select wealthy candidates and that financial capacity is associated with electoral success. Self-financing reduces the party’s financial burden, but can exclude capable public workers who lack resources.
Caste networks and money can reinforce each other. A candidate may bring community connections and financial capacity, while the party supplies its symbol, leadership appeal and alliance. The concern arises when financiers and intermediaries later expect preferential access to public decisions. For entrepreneurs, this can mean an environment in which connections appear more valuable than competitive prices or reliable work.
Money is influential without being decisive. Campaign finance cannot guarantee affection, credibility or control over how people vote in a secret ballot. Nor should legitimate spending on communication be confused with concealed inducements or the purchase of official favours.
Minority votes and the limits of electoral influence
Minority communities participate through ordinary concerns about work, education, welfare and leadership, alongside concerns about equal treatment and religious security. Their influence depends heavily on geography. A national minority may be a local majority or a significant part of a closely contested constituency.
Survey evidence from the 2024 general election illustrates strategic voting. An analysis citing Lokniti-CSDS data estimated that about 65 per cent of Muslim voters supported the INDIA alliance and ten per cent supported the NDA. Across states, support tended to favour the strongest challenger to the BJP. These are survey estimates, not religious classifications of official ballots.
Such consolidation should not be read as evidence that every voter followed religious instructions. It can reflect assessments of security, party positions and the available alternatives. Muslim voters also differ by region, caste, sect, income and occupation. Other religious minorities have equally varied political experiences.
There is a difficulty when a party assumes that a community has nowhere else to go. It may depend on those votes while offering limited leadership opportunities or weak attention to everyday needs. A community can matter electorally yet have restricted bargaining power.
The appropriate test is whether participation secures fair policing, effective public services, opportunities and a meaningful voice. Symbolic recognition alone cannot establish that the community’s ordinary members have benefited.
Family succession gives an advantage without guaranteeing a mandate
Family influence operates at several levels. Locally, an heir can inherit familiarity and networks of assistance. At constituency level, the advantages can include donors, workers and access to a nomination. At state level, a surname can stand for continuity of a movement. Nationally, recognition and organisational connections can give a newcomer prominence that others spend decades seeking.
A political family and a family-controlled party are nevertheless different things. A legislator’s relative entering politics does not necessarily mean the family controls the party. The deeper concern arises when leadership, nominations and alliances depend on one household. In that situation, the ceiling on advancement for an ordinary worker may be determined by birth rather than performance.
ADR’s September 2025 assessment identified dynastic backgrounds among about 21 per cent of the 5,203 sitting MPs, MLAs and MLCs it examined. The proportion was 31 per cent in the Lok Sabha and 20 per cent in state Assemblies. These figures measure family connections among legislators, not the proportion of parties controlled by families. They also show that non-dynastic entry remains substantial.
M.K. Stalin’s rise illustrates inherited advantage combined with accumulated experience. His relationship with M. Karunanidhi helped his political entry and advancement, but he also served for decades, including as deputy chief minister and opposition leader. The DMK-led alliance’s 2021 victory enabled him to become chief minister. Recognising family advantage need not mean denying experience; recognising competence does not resolve whether others had equal opportunities.
Electoral rejection remains possible. Rahul Gandhi lost Amethi in 2019 while winning Wayanad. In Andhra Pradesh, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy’s YSRCP fell from 151 Assembly seats in 2019 to 11 in 2024. The party drew on Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy’s legacy, but that did not protect its government from defeat. These outcomes do not identify a single cause; they establish that inherited recognition cannot guarantee renewed support.
Voters can accept an heir because they value experience, the party’s programme or continuity. They may also face a restricted choice because nomination has already been decided. Voting for an heir therefore does not prove approval of hereditary leadership. The relevant test is whether an equally capable person without the surname could realistically compete for the same position.
When family disputes become party disputes
Family succession can appear to offer unity after a founder’s retirement or death. Yet competing claims can turn relatives into rival centres of power. Workers, financiers and legislators take sides, while external allies negotiate with whichever faction they consider useful. The effects depend on each claimant’s independent strength and how far the dispute spreads through the organisation.
The Samajwadi Party’s conflict before the 2017 Uttar Pradesh election involved Akhilesh Yadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav and Shivpal Yadav. Leadership and candidate selection became subjects of public conflict. The SP fell from 224 seats in 2012 to 47 in 2017. Akhilesh acknowledged the feud as one contributing reason. It would be wrong to assign the whole decline to family conflict, given the BJP’s strength, alliance arrangements and judgments about governance.
Shivpal formed a separate party in 2018. Reconciliation became publicly visible during Dimple Yadav’s successful Mainpuri Lok Sabha by-election campaign in December 2022, followed by the merger of Shivpal’s party into the SP. The victory cannot isolate the effect of reunion, but it shows how restoring family cooperation can reunite political networks.
Tamil Nadu supplies a different outcome. M.K. Alagiri was expelled from the DMK in 2014 amid conflict with the leadership and his brother Stalin. He publicly opposed Stalin’s leadership ambitions before the 2021 election. Yet the party won under Stalin. The dispute did not produce two equally powerful statewide organisations. A family name gives a claimant visibility without necessarily bringing enough workers or voters to sustain a rival.
The Pawar family demonstrates how voters can distinguish between relatives and between elections. After the NCP split in 2023, Sharad Pawar and his nephew Ajit Pawar led opposing camps. In the 2024 Baramati Lok Sabha contest, Sharad’s daughter Supriya Sule defeated Ajit’s wife Sunetra Pawar by 158,333 votes. In the Assembly election later that year, Ajit defeated his nephew Yugendra Pawar, supported by Sharad, by 100,899 votes.
At party level, Sharad’s faction won eight Lok Sabha seats and Ajit’s one. In the subsequent Assembly election, Ajit’s party won 41 seats and Sharad’s ten. They contested different numbers of seats within different alliances. The Baramati parliamentary and Assembly constituencies are also not identical electorates. Even with those qualifications, the results show why no family branch can claim permanent possession of the voters. Legacy, candidate reputation, alliances and election context interact.
The LJP split and Chirag Paswan’s electoral recovery
The Lok Janshakti Party’s split in Bihar offers an instructive example of how a family dispute can divide a political organisation without settling who commands its voters. After Ram Vilas Paswan’s death in 2020, his son Chirag Paswan and brother Pashupati Kumar Paras became competing claimants to his political legacy. In the 2021 split, Paras took five of the party’s six Lok Sabha MPs with him. Chirag retained his own parliamentary seat but faced a severe organisational challenge.
The subsequent election showed that parliamentary strength and electoral appeal are different assets. For the 2024 Lok Sabha election, Chirag’s Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) received five constituencies under the NDA seat-sharing arrangement. It won all five: Hajipur, Jamui, Samastipur, Khagaria and Vaishali. Chirag himself won Hajipur, a constituency long associated with his father.
This outcome established that losing most sitting MPs had not extinguished Chirag’s political appeal. It did not establish that the family name alone produced the victories. The NDA alliance, support transferred by its partners, candidate choices and constituency conditions also mattered. Nor was the election a direct contest between the two factions across an identical set of seats.
The episode illustrates three distinct kinds of power: control of officeholders, recognition as the inheritor of a political legacy, and the ability to win elections within a viable alliance. One faction can possess the first while another proves stronger in the third. Family disputes can divide workers and resources, but voters need not follow the side with the most legislators. Political inheritance provides an advantage; public acceptance still has to be tested.
Corruption is condemned but weighed against other concerns
Indian voters can reject corruption in principle while continuing to support a politician facing allegations. They may distrust the allegations, believe the alternatives are worse, value the politician’s assistance or fear losing their community’s influence. An accusation, an investigation and a conviction must also be distinguished.
The Karnataka election of 2023 shows why concern and voting priority are different. In Lokniti-CSDS’s post-poll survey, about four per cent named corruption, scams or bribery as their most important voting issue. Roughly 29 per cent named unemployment. Corruption could still have influenced broader assessments of governance, but the figures caution against reducing the result to a single campaign slogan.
Delhi in 2015 illustrates the mobilisation possible around an anti-corruption identity. AAP, which emerged from the anti-corruption movement, won 67 of 70 Assembly seats. It also appealed through affordability and a promise of accessible government. The result demonstrates that integrity can become part of a successful political offer, without proving that corruption alone determined the vote.
Evidence also challenges the assumption that poorer voters simply prefer dishonest leaders. A vignette experiment in Uttar Pradesh found that people became less likely to choose hypothetical candidates described as corrupt or criminal. The researchers identified limited information and the absence of credible clean alternatives as possible explanations for actual electoral choices.
Corruption becomes politically powerful when evidence is credible, responsibility is clear and the consequences connect with ordinary life. A recruitment scandal can mean years of lost preparation. A badly built road can mean injury and repair costs. A bribe for a certificate can mean a family being denied something it should receive as a right.
For a professional examining public expenditure, proper paperwork is only the starting point. The further questions concern fair selection, reasonable costs and whether the promised service actually reached people.
Development matters when people experience it
Development is a genuine electoral concern, but its meaning differs across households. A farmer may prioritise irrigation and prices. A graduate may prioritise suitable employment. A woman seeking work may need safe transport and childcare. A small manufacturer may need dependable electricity and timely customer payments.
Delhi’s 2020 Assembly election provides an example of service delivery becoming central to a campaign. AAP won 62 of 70 seats after foregrounding electricity, water, schools and neighbourhood healthcare. Contemporary reporting identified household benefits and public services as important parts of its appeal. The result illustrates their political relevance, without isolating their contribution from leadership, organisation and competing campaigns.
Development does not provide an automatic electoral dividend. Research on India’s rural roads programme, examining roughly 180,000 roads across half a million villages, found no increase in ruling-party support attributable to road provision in its analysis. Infrastructure may be valued without producing a measurable vote reward in a particular setting.
Voters may regard a service as their entitlement, assign credit elsewhere or weigh other concerns more heavily. Governments must therefore distinguish development announced, development delivered and development experienced by households. These can be very different things.
Employment is about income and a credible future
Unemployment matters both to those seeking work and to their families. The concern extends beyond having no job. It includes irregular earnings, work below one’s qualifications, delayed recruitment and migration caused by limited local opportunities.
Yet economic dissatisfaction need not translate directly into a change of government. Voters may assign responsibility to different levels of government or believe the opposition would perform worse. Welfare can relieve immediate pressure, while leadership and future expectations remain important.
Lokniti-CSDS’s 2024 post-poll survey found that about 43 per cent reported an improvement in their household’s economic condition over five years, 35 per cent reported no change and about 18 per cent reported deterioration. This does not measure job quality or establish the cause of anyone’s vote. It shows why there was no single economic experience shared by all households.
For policymakers, the implication is practical. Growth needs to create opportunities that people can recognise in their own lives. Announcing investment is different from generating sustained employment, rising wages and viable businesses.
Long rule can produce fatigue but has no fixed expiry date
West Bengal’s Left Front lost in 2011 after 34 years in power. Tripura’s Left government lost in 2018 after 25 years. Odisha’s BJD lost in 2024 after about 24 years. In Sikkim in 2019, the SKM won 17 seats against the SDF’s 15, ending Pawan Kumar Chamling’s rule of more than 24 years. These are clear instances of long-serving governments being replaced.
Fatigue is a plausible part of the explanation, but the calendar does not establish causation. In West Bengal, land acquisition conflicts at Singur and Nandigram created concrete grievances. After the defeat, the CPI(M) acknowledged mistakes over those episodes and the accumulation of negative factors during prolonged rule.
Over time, local complaints accumulate. Leaders may become harder to approach. Intermediaries can become entrenched. Younger voters may have little memory of the achievements that first established the government’s reputation. The opposition becomes more attractive if it offers a believable alternative.
Continuity can also be rewarded. In Gujarat in 2022, the BJP won its seventh consecutive Assembly election with 156 of 182 seats. Long tenure plainly did not prevent another substantial victory.
The useful distinction is between dissatisfaction with an individual representative, dissatisfaction with the government and confidence in the alternative. These judgments do not always move together.
Media influences which questions become urgent
Media can strengthen accountability through investigation and local reporting. It can also distort electoral judgment through selective attention, concealed sponsorship, misleading clips and repeated unsupported claims. Strong editorial views are legitimate; deception requires a different assessment.
Television debates can make one controversy dominate the campaign. Social platforms can carry political material through trusted personal networks. Newspapers can expose wrongdoing, but promotional material disguised as news can borrow the authority of independent journalism.
A study conducted after West Bengal’s 2021 election exposed survey respondents to hostile religious misinformation. It found increased negative feelings towards the other religious group. The corrections tested did not remove that emotional effect. The experiment measured attitudes, not actual changes in votes, so it cannot tell us how many seats misinformation affected.
The distinction is important. A message may increase fear or hostility without changing a person’s preferred party. It can nevertheless change the atmosphere in which citizens assess their choices.
Media influence also meets the limits of lived experience. A business owner knows whether payments arrive; a parent knows whether a school functions. Credible reporting helps connect these experiences to evidence about responsibility and performance.
Campaign energy helps but hostility is no guarantee
Campaigning informs, persuades and mobilises. A packed rally demonstrates enthusiasm among attendees, but does not establish that undecided voters have changed their minds. Digital circulation can extend a rally’s reach well beyond the venue.
The Bihar Assembly election of 2015 is instructive. The JD(U), RJD and Congress alliance won 178 of 243 seats despite an intensive campaign by the BJP-led NDA. Research by Gilles Verniers and Neelanjan Sircar emphasised coalition strategy and coordination in explaining the outcome. Visibility alone could not overcome those electoral relationships.
This is not proof that vigorous campaigning fails. It shows why campaigning must be understood alongside alliances, local organisation and the choices voters already face.
Forceful criticism can clarify a government’s failures. Personal abuse may instead create sympathy for the target or doubts about the attacker’s judgment. A major research synthesis found that negative campaigning was more memorable, but did not establish a dependable general advantage in winning votes. Much of that evidence comes from outside India and should be applied cautiously.
After polling the mandate can change its governing form
Voting determines the distribution of seats. Negotiation determines which combination governs. These are connected decisions, but they are not identical. A vote may support the candidate, the party, a declared alliance or the defeat of another party. We cannot identify the precise motivation of every voter. Nevertheless, pre-election partnerships create reasonable expectations because parties ask supporters to vote for allied candidates.
Maharashtra in 2019 illustrates a reversal of that offer. The BJP and Shiv Sena contested together and won 105 and 56 seats respectively, giving them 161 in a 288-member Assembly. Their alliance therefore had a majority. After disagreement over government formation, Shiv Sena instead formed the Maha Vikas Aghadi with the NCP and Congress. A partnership that had secured enough seats did not become the government.
Supporters of the new arrangement could argue that the original alliance had become unworkable. Critics could reasonably ask why voters were not offered the alternative partnership before polling. Legislative support can establish a government’s authority while leaving a serious dispute about political consistency with the campaign.
Karnataka in 2018 was different. The BJP initially won 104 seats, Congress 78 and JD(S) 37. No party had a majority. Congress and JD(S), which had competed against each other, combined to support H.D. Kumaraswamy. Their combined 115 seats provided a basis for government formation, though voters could question the partnership and the choice of chief minister from its smaller party.
The coalition subsequently collapsed in July 2019 amid resignations and absences, losing a confidence vote by 99 to 105. This adds a second issue: the majority itself can change between general elections. Allegations about inducements require evidence; the documented change in parliamentary support does not by itself establish why every legislator acted.
Goa and Manipur in 2017 reinforce the distinction between the largest party and a majority. Congress won 17 seats against the BJP’s 13 in Goa, and 28 against 21 in Manipur. Neither Congress tally was a majority. The BJP assembled support to form governments in both states. These cases demonstrate the importance of post-poll coordination, while leaving questions about whether voters understood the smaller parties’ possible alliances.
Bihar presents repeated changes within Assembly terms. In 2015, JD(U), RJD and Congress won together against the BJP-led NDA. In 2017, Nitish Kumar left that arrangement and formed a government with BJP support. After contesting the 2020 election within the NDA, he left it in 2022 to govern with RJD, Congress and other partners, then returned to the NDA in January 2024. No fresh Assembly election accompanied each switch.
Each change had its own stated explanation. The wider democratic concern is whether alliance promises remain credible when a party repeatedly governs with those it asked voters to oppose. A floor majority answers who can govern at that moment; it does not settle every question about what citizens expected their vote to produce.
Maharashtra’s 2022 Shiv Sena rebellion introduced another distinction: party authority and legislative factional strength. Eknath Shinde’s rebellion led to a government supported by the BJP. In May 2023, the Supreme Court held that the Governor lacked the required objective basis for directing Uddhav Thackeray to face a floor test. It did not restore his government because he had resigned without facing that test. The judgment also distinguished the political party’s authority from that of its legislative wing. These are specific holdings about that episode, not a statement of the subsequent status of every related dispute.
There can also be substantive reasons to change support. In 2008, the Left withdrew support from the UPA over the India–US civil nuclear agreement. The government sought and won a confidence vote. An identifiable policy disagreement gave citizens something concrete to assess. Requiring parties to preserve alliances regardless of every policy decision would weaken accountability of another kind.
The fairest assessment therefore asks what was promised, whether the result required compromise, what substantive disagreement arose, and what public programme the new arrangement offers. Negotiating after a hung verdict generally has a stronger democratic justification than abandoning a winning alliance without a convincing explanation. A change of alliance, individual defection and an internal party split are separate events and should not be treated as legally interchangeable.
Learning across the cases
These examples reveal several limits to political control. BSP’s 2007 coalition shows that identity-based organisation can reach beyond one community. Delhi’s 2015 and 2020 elections show the appeal of integrity and service delivery. The defeats of long-serving governments show that established networks can lose public confidence. Gujarat demonstrates that longevity need not produce defeat. The Paswan and Pawar cases show that officeholders, inheritance and voter support are distinct assets. Bihar and Maharashtra show how leadership bargaining can change the government after the electorate has voted.
The 2024 national election provides a further reminder about scale. The BJP won 240 Lok Sabha seats, down from 303 in 2019, and returned to office with coalition partners. Continuity of government coexisted with a change in the distribution of bargaining power. It would be misleading to interpret that result as either complete rejection or unqualified endorsement, or to explain it through a single nationwide cause.
More policy accountability is possible
India does not need to wait for ideology to arrive. Ambedkarite politics, Dravidian politics, Hindu nationalism and Left politics already contain ideas about society and the state. Identity and ideology frequently overlap. The next improvement would be stronger accountability for the policies those ideas produce.
That requires public services people can obtain without personal intervention. It requires parties to explain the cost and implementation of their promises. It requires transparent finance, competitive procurement and credible information about results. Representation remains important where exclusion persists, but leaders claiming to represent a community must also answer for their performance.
There is encouraging evidence that scrutiny can change incentives. A Delhi experiment found that councillors expecting public newspaper report cards increased spending benefiting poorer residents in high-slum areas. Parties also benefited electorally from strong spending records. Publicly available performance information mattered more than private advice alone.
The experience of Dalit empowerment changes the balance of this assessment. Electoral politics has not simply rearranged existing elites; it has also opened institutions to people historically excluded from authority. That achievement should be protected and extended. The evidence supports neither dismissing representation as empty symbolism nor treating political visibility as proof of completed social justice.
The quality of Indian democracy cannot be judged only by the size of rallies, the diversity of candidates or the frequency of changes in government. It must also be judged by whether citizens can obtain fair treatment and build better lives without depending on powerful intermediaries. For historically excluded communities, the test includes better schools, secure livelihoods, effective protection against discrimination and the freedom to question their own representatives.
A voter may reasonably value community dignity, honest administration and economic opportunity together. Democratic progress depends on making parties answerable for all three through evidence, public debate and institutions that serve people fairly.
Sources and reading notes
References are grouped here to preserve the flow of the essay. Election outcomes are facts; explanations of voter motivation are interpretations unless supported by a specified study. Older research is used for particular mechanisms, while the political examples fall within the past twenty years. No claim is made that each mechanism has an identical effect across India.
1. Social Justice through Inclusion The Consequences of Electoral Quotas in India. Francesca R Jensenius, Oxford University Press, 2017; political inclusion and discrimination.
https://academic.oup.com/book/7094
2. Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities. Rohini Pande, American Economic Review, 2003.
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/000282803769206232
3. Impact of reservations on public good allocations. J-PAL research summary; infrastructure in lower-caste areas.
https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/impact-pr-reservations-public-good-allocations
4. SC reserved constituencies in the Lok Sabha. Election Commission of India Atlas, 2021; constituency framework.
https://www.eci.gov.in/EBooks/eci-atlas/files/basic-html/page25.html
5. Handbook on Social Welfare Statistics. Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, 2016; historical Census literacy and poverty series.
https://socialjustice.gov.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/HANDBOOK%20Social%20Welfare%20Statistice%202016.pdf
6. All India Survey on Higher Education 2021 to 2022. Ministry of Education release, January 2024; gross enrolment ratios.
https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1999713&lang=2®=48
7. Household Consumption Expenditure Survey 2023 to 2024. MoSPI release, 30 January 2025; Table 3 social-group consumption without imputation.
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2097601&lang=2®=48
8. Parliamentary reply on registered cases and enforcement of the SC ST Prevention of Atrocities Act. Government of India, 2026; NCRB data for 2024.
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2290065&lang=2&re=®=48
9. Political families among sitting legislators. ADR, September 2025; 5,203 legislators examined in the updated report.
https://www.adrindia.org/content/Analysis-of-Sitting-MPs-and-MLAs-who-have-dynastic-background
10. Stalin’s experience before becoming chief minister. New Indian Express, 7 May 2021.
https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2021/May/07/muthuvel-karunanidhi-stalin-takes-oath-as-chief-minister-of-tamil-nadu-2299559.html
11. Rahul Gandhi wins Wayanad and loses Amethi in 2019. NDTV, 4 June 2019.
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/rahul-gandhi-to-visit-wayanad-to-thank-electorate-on-poll-win-2044493
12. YSRCP falls from 151 seats to 11. Indian Express, 2024; Andhra Pradesh results.
https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/chandrababu-naidu-tdp-nda-andhra-pradesh-jagan-lok-sabha-assembly-seats-9372129/
13. Akhilesh acknowledges the family feud as one reason for defeat. Times of India, April 2017.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/family-feud-behind-poll-debacle-admits-akhilesh-yadav/articleshow/58392528.cms
14. Mainpuri victory and the SP family reconciliation. Indian Express, December 2022.
https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/mainpuri-triumph-heals-akhilesh-family-rift-shivpal-merges-party-with-sp-8313802/
15. Alagiri and the DMK succession dispute. Indian Express, December 2020.
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/m-k-alagiri-says-no-scope-to-work-with-dmk-again-does-not-rule-out-floating-party-7118770/lite/
16. Stalin forms government after the 2021 election. Indian Express, May 2021.
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chennai/mk-stalin-stakes-claim-to-form-government-in-tamil-nadu-7302772/
17. Supriya Sule defeats Sunetra Pawar in Baramati. Indian Express, 5 June 2024.
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/pune/supriya-sule-baramati-cause-concern-mahayuti-assembly-polls-9374044/
18. Ajit Pawar defeats Yugendra Pawar in Baramati. NDTV Profit, November 2024.
https://www.ndtvprofit.com/india/baramati-assembly-polls-result-2024-ajit-pawar-leads-by-15382-votes-in-this-pawar-vs-pawar-battle-9971062
19. NCP factions in the 2024 parliamentary and Assembly elections. ThePrint, November 2024; eight parliamentary seats and ten Assembly seats for NCP SP, against 41 Assembly seats for Ajit Pawar’s party.
https://theprint.in/elections/voters-answer-real-ncp-question-ajit-pawar-ascendant-sharad-pawar-faction-gets-just-10-seats/2368934/
20. Ajit Pawar faction wins one Lok Sabha seat in 2024. Times of India, June 2024.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/ajit-pawars-defeat-in-lok-sabha-polls-highlights-ncps-internal-struggles/articleshow/110714905.cms
21. AAP wins 67 Delhi seats in 2015. NDTV, February 2015.
https://www.ndtv.com/delhi-news/indias-aam-aadmi-party-sweeps-elections-in-delhi-738597
22. Sikkim government changes in 2019. PTI, Business Standard, 23 May 2019; SKM 17 and SDF 15 seats.
https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/pawan-chamling-era-ends-in-sikkim-after-over-24-years-119052302194_1.html
23. Presidential primaries and the Electoral College. US Government explanations of nomination and presidential selection.
https://www.usa.gov/presidential-election-process
24. Maharashtra election results and pre-election alliances in 2019. NDTV, October 2019.
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/maharashtra-election-result-2019-live-updates-advantage-bjp-shiv-sena-as-counting-of-votes-begins-at-2121736
25. Karnataka hung verdict and post-election coalition in 2018. Indian Express, May 2018.
https://indianexpress.com/elections/karnataka-assembly-election-results-2018-congress-jds-alliance-deve-gowda-amit-shah-rahul-gandhi-siddaramaiah-yeddyurappa-5178369/
26. Karnataka coalition loses its confidence vote in 2019. Indian Express, July 2019.
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/karnataka-trust-vote-kumaraswamy-yeddyurappa-bjp-congress-jds-5846365/
27. Goa coalition government formation in 2017. Indian Express, March 2017.
https://indianexpress.com/elections/goa-assembly-elections-2017/congress-cries-foul-as-goa-slips-out-manohar-parrikar-invited-to-form-govt-4567425/
28. Manipur government formation and legislative support in 2017. Supreme Court judgment, 21 January 2020; factual background.
https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/27562/27562_2019_4_1501_19772_Judgement_21-Jan-2020.pdf
29. Nitish Kumar alliance changes from 2015 to 2024. Business Standard, August 2025; retrospective timeline.
https://www.business-standard.com/amp/elections/bihar-elections/nitish-kumar-alliances-timeline-bihar-elections-2025-125080700971_1.html
30. Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary Governor of Maharashtra. Supreme Court, 11 May 2023; conclusions on the floor-test direction, resignation and party authority.
https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/20234/20234_2022_1_1502_44512_Judgement_11-May-2023.pdf
31. UPA confidence motion following Left withdrawal in 2008. Journal of Parliamentary Information, December 2008; parliamentary record.
https://eparlib.sansad.in/bitstream/123456789/764108/1/jpi_december_2008.pdf
32. BJP wins 240 Lok Sabha seats in 2024. Akashvani News, 5 June 2024.
https://newsonair.gov.in/bjp-led-nda-secures-absolute-majority-in-lok-sabha-elections-by-winning-292-seats-bjp-emerges-as-single-largest-party-with-240-seats/
33. Chirag Paswan and Pashupati Paras seat sharing after the LJP split. Times of India, 14 March 2024; reports Paras taking five of six MPs and the proposed five-seat allocation to Chirag.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-deal-with-bjp-chirag-paswan-gets-5-bihar-seats/articleshow/108474063.cms
34. Chirag Paswan party wins all five seats in Bihar. New Indian Express, 6 June 2024; results and constituency list.
https://www.newindianexpress.com/amp/story/india/2024/Jun/06/perfect-score-chirag-new-dalit-icon-in-bihar
35. BSP victory and coalition building in Uttar Pradesh in 2007. PTI report, 11 May 2007.
https://m.rediff.com/news/report/uppoll/20070511.htm
36. Can political parties improve minority wellbeing Evidence from India’s Silent Revolution. Journal of Development Economics, 2022.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387822000852
37. Inequality in policy implementation caste and electrification in rural India. Aklin, Cheng and Urpelainen, Journal of Public Policy.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-public-policy/article/abs/inequality-in-policy-implementation-caste-and-electrification-in-rural-india/1B09DD4CBFDA51D12337F858CECB096D
38. Lok Sabha 2024 winners and declared assets. Association for Democratic Reforms, MyNeta database.
https://myneta.info/LokSabha2024/index.php?action=show_winners&sort=edu
39. Money Matters in Indian Elections Why Parties Depend on Wealthy Candidates. Neelanjan Sircar, Carnegie Endowment, 2018.
https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/07/money-matters-in-indian-elections-why-parties-depend-on-wealthy-candidates/
40. The Resilience of India’s Fourth Party System. Carnegie Endowment, 2024; discussion of Lokniti-CSDS estimates.
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/09/india-election-bjp-party-politics
41. Karnataka Post Poll 2023 Survey Findings. Lokniti-CSDS; stated most important voting issues.
https://lokniti.org/media/PDF-upload/1703236330_23412100_download_report.pdf
42. Are Poor Voters Indifferent to Whether Elected Leaders Are Criminal or Corrupt. Banerjee, Green, McManus and Pande, Political Communication, 2014; Yale research summary.
https://ie.yale.edu/research/are-poor-voters-indifferent-whether-elected-leaders-are-criminal-or-corrupt-vignette-experiment
43. Behind AAP’s 62 out of 70 score the winning formula. Indian Express, 16 February 2020; contemporary reporting and interpretation.
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/the-winning-formula-aam-aadmi-party-delhi-polls-victory-education-electricity-water-schemes-6270116/
44. Do Citizens Enforce Accountability for Public Goods Provision. Tanushree Goyal, The Journal of Politics, 2024; Princeton research record.
https://collaborate.princeton.edu/en/publications/do-citizens-enforce-accountability-for-public-goods-provision-evi/
45. Social and Political Barometer Post Poll Study 2024. Lokniti-CSDS, question 27 on household economic conditions.
https://lokniti.org/media/PDF-upload/1718435207_67606300_download_report.pdf
46. West Bengal election result in 2011. Indian Express, 14 May 2011.
https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/buddha-loses-cpm-crumbles-city-to-village/
47. Singur and Nandigram proved costly. IANS report of CPI(M) assessment, NDTV, 12 June 2011.
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/singur-nandigram-proved-costly-but-left-still-relevant-cpi-m-458326
48. Tripura election result in 2018. PTI report, Onmanorama, 3 March 2018.
https://www.onmanorama.com/news/nation/2018/03/03/tripura-election-2018-bjp-landlside-win-cpm-defeated-manik-sarkar.html
49. Profile of the 17th Odisha Legislative Assembly. PRS Legislative Research, 2024; election results sourced to ECI.
https://prsindia.org/legislatures/state/vital-stats/profile-of-the-17th-odisha-legislative-assembly
50. Gujarat seventh consecutive BJP victory. PTI report, Times of India, 8 December 2022.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/elections/assembly-elections/gujarat/news/bjp-retains-gujarat-for-a-seventh-straight-term-sets-new-records-congress-bags-himachal-kejriwal-declares-aap-national-party/articleshow/96090059.cms
51. Misinformation Narratives and Intergroup Attitudes Evidence from India. Daxecker, Fjelde and Prasad, The Journal of Politics, 2025.
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/732979
52. Assessing Party Performance and Alliance Dynamics in the 2015 Bihar Election. Gilles Verniers and Neelanjan Sircar, Centre for Policy Research, 2016.
https://cprindia.org/workingpapers/assessing-party-performance-and-alliance-dynamics-in-the-2015-bihar-election/
53. The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns A Meta Analytic Reassessment. Lau, Sigelman and Rovner, The Journal of Politics, 2007.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00618.x
54. Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians. Banerjee, Enevoldsen, Pande and Walton, American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 2024.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220088
55. How Ideology Shapes Indian Politics. Nicholas Haas and Rajeshwari Majumdar, Carnegie Endowment, 2023.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/18/how-ideology-shapes-indian-politics-pub-91249
CA. S. Muralidharan |
